Public economics studies how government taxing and spending activities affect the
economy-economic efficiency and the distribution of income and wealth. This comprehensive
text in public economics covers the core topics market failure and taxation as well as
recent developments in the political economy and public choice literatures. It is unique
not only in its broad scope but in its balance between public finance and public choice
and its combination of theory and relevant empirical evidence.
After introducing the theory and methodology of public economics and reviewing the
efficiency of the competitive equilibrium, the book presents a historical and theoretical
overview of the public sector. It then discusses departures from efficiency, including
imperfect competition and asymmetric information; issues in political economy, including
rent-seeking (a topic often omitted from other texts); equity; taxation issues, including
tax evasion and its consequences; fiscal federalism and tax competition among independent
jurisdictions; and the intertemporal issues of social security and economic growth.
This text introduces the reader to the theory of public economics and the most significant
results of the analysis, providing an overview of the current state of the field. It is
accessible to anyone with a background of intermediate microeconomics and macroeconomics
and can be used in advanced undergraduate as well as graduate courses. Although the
mathematics has been kept to a minimum, the book remains analytical rather than
discursive. Annotated suggestions for further reading and numerous exercises are included
at the end of each chapter.
Jean Hindriks is Professor in the Economics Department and Codirector
of the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université
catholique de Louvain.
Gareth D. Myles is Head of Department and Professor of Economics at the
University of Exeter and a Research Fellow at the Institute for Fiscal Studies. He is the
author of Public Economics.
Table of contents
Preface
I PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
1 An Introduction to Public Economics
1.1 Public Economics
1.2 Methods
1.3 Analyzing Policy
1.4 Preview
1.5 Scope
Further Reading
Exercises
2 Equilibrium and Efficiency
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Economic Models
2.3 Competitive Economies
2.4 Efficiency of Competition
2.5 Lump-Sum Taxation
2.6 Discussion of Assumptions
2.7 Summary
Further Reading
Exercises
II GOVERNMENT
3 Public Sector Statistics
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Historical Development
3.3 Composition of Expenditure
3.4 Revenue
3.5 Measuring the Government
3.6 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
4 Theories of the Public Sector
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Justification for the Public Sector
4.3 Public Sector Growth
4.4 Excessive Government
4.5 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
III DEPARTURES FROM EFFICIENCY
5 Public Goods
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Definitions
5.3 Private Provision
5.4 Efficient Provision
5.5 Voting
5.6 Personalized Prices
5.7 Mechanism Design
5.8 More on Private Provision
5.9 Fund-Raising Campaigns
5.10 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
6 Club Goods and Local Public Goods
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Definitions
6.3 Single-Product Clubs
6.4 Clubs and the Economy
6.5 Local Public Goods
6.6 The Tiebout Hypothesis
6.7 Empirical Tests
6.8 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
7 Externalities
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Externalities Defined
7.3 Market Inefficiency
7.4 Externality Examples
7.5 Pigouvian Taxation
7.6 Licenses
7.7 Internalization
7.8 The Coase Theorem
7.9 Nonconvexity
7.10 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
8 Imperfect Competition
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Concepts of Competition
8.3 Market Structure
8.4 Welfare
8.5 Tax Incidence
8.6 Specific and Ad valorem Taxation
8.7 Regulation of Monopoly
8.8 Regulation of Oligopoly
8.9 Unions and Taxation
8.10 Monopsony
8.11 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
9 Asymmetric Informatio
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Hidden Knowledge and Hidden Action
9.3 Actions or Knowledge?
9.4 Market Unraveling
9.5 Screening
9.6 Signaling
9.7 Moral Hazard (Hidden Action)
9.8 Public Provision of Health Care
9.9 Evidence
9.10 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
IV POLITICAL ECONOMY
10 Voting
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Stability
10.3 Impossibility
10.4 Majority Rule
10.5 Alternatives to Majority Rule
10.6 The Paradox of Voting
10.7 The "Alabama" Paradox
10.8 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
11 Rent-Seeking
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Definitions
11.3 Rent-Seeking Games
11.4 Social Cost of Monopoly
11.5 Equilibrium Effects
11.6 Government Policy
11.7 Informative Lobbying
11.8 Controlling Rent-Seeking
11.9 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
V EQUITY AND DISTRIBUTION
12 Optimality and Comparability
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Social Optimality
12.3 Lump-Sum Taxes
12.4 Impossibility of Lump-Sum Taxes
12.5 Non–Tax Redistribution
12.6 Aspects of Pareto-Efficiency
12.7 Social Welfare Functions
12.8 The Impossibility
12.9 Interpersonal Comparability
12.10 Comparability and Social Welfare
12.11 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
13 Inequality and Poverty
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Measuring Income
13.3 Equivalence Scales
13.4 Inequality Measurement
13.5 Poverty
13.6 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
VI TAXATION
14 Commodity Taxation
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Deadweight Loss
14.3 Optimal Taxation
14.4 Production Efficiency
14.5 Tax Rules
14.6 Equity Considerations
14.7 Applications
14.8 Efficient Taxation
14.9 Public Sector Pricing
14.10 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
15 Income Taxation
15.1 Introduction
15.2 Equity and Efficiency
15.3 Taxation and Labor Supply
15.4 Empirical Evidence
15.5 Optimal Income Taxation
15.6 Two Specializations
15.7 Numerical Results
15.8 Tax Mix: Separation Principle
15.9 Voting over a Flat Tax
15.10 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
16 Tax Evasion
16.1 Introduction
16.2 The Extent of Evasion
16.3 The Evasion Decision
16.4 Auditing and Punishment
16.5 Evidence on Evasion
16.6 Effect of Honesty
16.7 Tax Compliance Game
16.8 Compliance and Social Interaction
16.9 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
VII MULTIPLE JURISDICTIONS
17 Fiscal Federalism
17.1 Introduction
17.2 Arguments for Multi-level Government
17.3 Optimal Structure: Efficiency versus Stability
17.4 Accountability
17.5 Risk Sharing
17.6 Evidence on Decentralization
17.7 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
18 Fiscal Competition
18.1 Introduction
18.2 Tax Competition
18.3 Income Distribution
18.4 Intergovernmental Transfers
18.5 Evidence
18.6 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
VIII ISSUES OF TIME
19 Intertemporal Efficiency
19.1 Introduction
19.2 Overlapping Generations
19.3 Equilibrium
19.4 Optimality and Efficiency
19.5 Testing Efficiency
19.6 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
20 Social Security and Debt
20.1 Introduction
20.2 Types of System
20.3 The Pensions Crisis
20.4 The Simplest Program
20.5 Social Security and Production
20.6 Population Growth
20.7 Sustaining a Program
20.8 Ricardian Equivalence
20.9 Social Security Reform
20.10 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
21 Economic Growth
21.1 Introduction
21.2 Exogenous Growth
21.3 Endogenous Growth
21.4 Policy Reform
21.5 Empirical Evidence
21.6 Conclusions
Further Reading
Exercises
720 pages, softcover
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